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Abstract: This article challenges the Kripkean interpretation of a posteriori necessities. It will be
demonstrated, by an analysis of classic examples, that the modal content of supposed a posteriori
necessities is more complicated than the Kripkean line suggests. We will see that further research is
needed concerning the a priori principles underlying all a posteriori necessities. In the course of this
analysis it will emerge that the modal content of a posteriori necessities can best be described in
terms of a Finean conception of modality – by giving essences priority over modality. The upshot of
this is that we might be able to establish the necessity of certain supposed a posteriori necessities by
a priori means.
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1. The Traditional Account
The traditional, widely accepted story about a posteriori necessities goes like this:
an empirical discovery associated with a supposed a posteriori necessary statement
together with a certain general a priori principle imply that an identity statement
is an a posteriori necessity. This story comes of course from Saul Kripke (1980,
p. 109), although presently we are not concerned about what Kripke himself might
think about these matters. In any case it is clear that there is an interpretation of
Kripke which goes as suggested above and seems to be fairly widely accepted
amongst Kripkeans.1
What we want to ask now is: what is the modal content of a posteriori necessities
based on; in virtue of what are they necessary? At least in most cases, the modal
content seems to come from the a priori part. To take one of the usual examples,
consider the identity statement “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. We can analyse it as
follows. We know a posteriori that Hesperus is in fact Phosphorus, that is, we know
that the identity statement “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is true. Further, we know a
priori that if Hesperus is Phosphorus, then it is necessary that Hesperus is Phos-
phorus. Clearly, Hesperus is necessarily Phosphorus in virtue of the a priori part.
Even if this story were correct, more needs to be said in its support. Kripke does
not seem to be particularly concerned about this, but his commentators have
attempted to fill the gaps. One issue that is especially pressing concerns the
1 See, for instance, Hughes (2004) or Soames (2005).
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empirical discoveries associated with a posteriori necessities, i.e., how do we know
that an identity statement is in fact true? Christopher Hughes suggests the following
concerning “Hesperus is Phosphorus”:
We know that Hesperus is a celestial body and that Phosphorus is a celestial body. Also, given what
we know about where Hesperus and Phosphorus are at certain times, and about how celestial bodies
move, we can infer that Hesperus and Phosphorus are in some of – indeed, in all of – the same places
at all the same times. And we know that different celestial bodies don’t occupy all the same places
at all the same times. So we know that Hesperus and Phosphorus are the same celestial body, and
thus that Hesperus = Phosphorus is true (Hughes, 2004, p. 213; footnote omitted).
This analysis, it seems, is very much on the right lines. However, it complicates
matters somewhat, for now it seems that further modal content is introduced to the
story before the Kripkean proof of the necessity of identity enters the picture.
Namely, we know that different celestial bodies do not occupy all the same places
at all the same times. This information concerns the essential features of celestial
bodies, and it is crucial for the empirical discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus.
Furthermore, it seems that the modality involved here is of a different kind than the
modality involved in the a priori truth that if an identity statement is true it is
necessarily true. This is because the latter is based on the logical proof familiar
from Kripke (1971) and, if true, expresses something general about identity state-
ments. This logical proof, however, amounts to little unless further assumptions are
introduced. Specifically, its applicability may be restricted to identity statements
concerning singular terms (cf. Soames, 2005, pp. 23–24), yet examples concerning
theoretical identity statements such as “Water = H2O” are generally considered to
be the most important ones. Furthermore, the modality appears to be attached to all
identity statements simply because they are identity statements, even though there
are important discrepancies between the identity conditions of different kinds of
entities. Indeed, it would appear that the modality in question is logical in nature,
whereas the modality in the empirical finding is metaphysical: it concerns the
essences of the entities under scrutiny, it expresses something metaphysically
substantial. What is the difference between these types of modality? Well, logical
necessity, which I take to be a subspecies of metaphysical modality, does not entail
metaphysical necessity.2 On reflection, I do not think that this is a very controversial
point: we have a number of alternative logics with different inference rules and
hence we can have different results concerning what is necessary. Unless we have
some reason to think that the logic we use corresponds with reality, then there is no
2 At least insofar as we are dealing with so-called strict or narrow logical necessity, i.e., necessity in
virtue of the laws of logic and necessity in virtue of the laws of logic plus the definitions of concepts,
respectively. So-called broad logical necessity, which takes into account the natures of entities, is effec-
tively metaphysical necessity.
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direct entailment from logical modality to metaphysical modality. Indeed, if “Water
= H2O” is a necessary truth, then this necessity is grounded in a metaphysical truth,
not a logical one, as we will see in the course of this paper. In any case, even if there
is a way for the Kripkean to overcome these problems, the question of the additional
modal content within the empirical discovery remains.
2. The A Priori Content that Precedes Empirical Discoveries
What is the source of the additional modal content in the empirical discovery? If we
look at the passage quoted from Hughes above, it appears that he is listing some
essential features of celestial bodies, planets. Moreover, the modal content of the
empirical discovery seems to be grounded in these essential features, as it is exactly
in virtue of the impossibility of celestial bodies occupying all the same places at all
the same times that we know Hesperus and Phosphorus to be identical. In other
words, we need a priori knowledge about the general essence of the kind “planet”
to be able to derive that Hesperus is necessarily Phosphorus.3
Perhaps we ought to look deeper into this a priori part, as the apriority of the fact
that two material bodies cannot occupy the same space-time point could be con-
tested. It could be argued that this is an empirical discovery, perhaps based on
Coulomb’s law4 and the fact that material particles are subject to this law. But a
closer examination reveals once again that there is a priori content sneaked in with
the empirical discovery. Coulomb’s law is a generalisation and it is indeed based on
empirical observations, but if it is to carry any modal content, namely to imply that
material bodies of the same kind are necessarily identical if they occupy the same
space-time point, something more must be said. Although Coulomb’s law seems to
have an extremely wide applicability, empirical experiments can never verify its
universal applicability. Accordingly, we need to combine Coulomb’s law with a
theory of electrostatic interaction. Furthermore, there are even more fundamental
laws in effect here, specifically the Pauli Exclusion Principle,5 which is ultimately
responsible for the space-occupying effect of all material particles. There are,
however, particles that are not subject to the Pauli Exclusion Principle, namely
bosons.
3 Furthermore, it is of course assumed here that Venus is a planet and that “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus”
are directly referential. Additionally, it may be that the essential features are knowable (only) a priori, as
Lowe (2007) argues. We will consider this in due course. This has also been discussed in Tahko (2008).
4 Coulomb’s law concerns the relations between electric charges, namely, like chargers repel and unlike
chargers attract.
5 The Pauli Exclusion Principle states that no two identical fermions can have the same quantum number
at the same time.
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All that has been said above is interesting, but does it have a genuine bearing on
the identity conditions of massive material bodies, such as planets? I think not:
naturally we are interested in the microphysical story in the background because the
macrophysical story that we are primarily interested in presumably supervenes on
the microphysical, but we do not need to tell the microphysical story in every
instance. Regardless of whether there are particles that violate Coulomb’s law or
the Pauli Exclusion Principle, we know that material bodies of the kind “planet” are
most certainly subject to these laws and it is no doubt essential to material bodies
of this kind that they occupy space. We do not have a priori access to the laws of
physics, so we can only know a posteriori that planets are subject to certain laws.
However, I think that we do know a priori that entities of the kind “planet” occupy
space, indeed, that this is essential to them. The purpose of this discussion is simply
to demonstrate that the empirical issues concerning these matters are quite com-
plicated, but perhaps we should be more interested in what is essential to the kind
“planet”. Accordingly, the a priori content that precedes the empirical finding that
Hesperus is Phosphorus does not reduce all the way to quantum mechanics,
although there is further a priori content also in the microphysical story.
3. Further Complications: the Status of Essences and A Priori Principles
Our analysis of a posteriori necessity hints towards an interpretation of metaphysi-
cal modality in terms of essences. As Kit Fine puts it, “we should view metaphysi-
cal necessity as a special case of essence” (1994, p. 8), rather than the other way
around. Grounding metaphysical modality in essences does not only enable us to
explain the modal content in empirical discoveries associated with a posteriori
necessities, but also highlights the complexity of identity statements that are
usually considered to be a posteriori and necessary. However, it appears that
establishing the necessity of a given identity statement might not be quite as easy
as the Kripkean line suggests. Theoretical identity statements, such as “Water =
H2O”, are especially interesting in this regard. Consider how Scott Soames explains
their necessity:6
The [Soames-type Kripkean] account holds that “water” is a non-descriptive, directly-referential
term designating a substance – where substances are taken to be physically constitutive kinds
(instances of which share the same basic physical constitution). It is further assumed that a kind of
this sort may have different instances in different world-states, and that if a and b are kinds with the
same instances in all possible world-states, then a is b. These are clearly metaphysical assumptions,
to which we add the natural corollary that for any substance, s, if, in some possible world-state,
6 There is an ongoing debate between Soames and E. J. Lowe about the necessary a posteriori; the quoted
passage is from Soames’ reply to Lowe – we will attempt to get into the bottom of this debate.
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instances of s have a certain molecular structure, then instances of s have that structure in every
world-state. In other words, we assume that it is an essential property of a substance that instances
of it have the molecular structure they do. From this it follows that [“Water = H2O”] is necessary if
true, and that “H2O” – which I take to be equivalent to “the substance instances of which have a
molecular structure with two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom” – is a rigid designator. Being
true, [“Water = H2O”] is, therefore, necessary. Since knowing the proposition it expresses requires
knowing of a certain substance that its instances have a particular chemical structure, [“Water =
H2O”] is knowable only a posteriori (Soames, 2007, p. 36; footnotes omitted).
Apparently, the modal content of the supposed a posteriori necessity “Water =
H2O” is based on the assumption that substances, such as water, essentially have the
molecular structure that they do and therefore water has the molecular structure
H2O in all possible worlds. What has been said in support of this assumption?7
Nothing, as far as I can tell. To say generally of substances that they essentially have
the molecular structure that they do is a very strong claim indeed. Yet Soames gives
no explicit support for the assumption. Take the case of water and H2O. What can
be said in support of the assumption that water essentially has the molecular
structure it in fact does? Clearly, no amount of research into the chemistry of water
will settle the matter, because we can only study the actual molecular structure of
water. The claim is, however, that the organisation of hydrogen and oxygen atoms
in water is necessary. It could be suggested that the general principle, that sub-
stances have their molecular structures essentially, is only a derivative of actual
cases, but in this case the principle would hardly be a priori. Alternatively, perhaps
the principle is not true of all substances, but rather confined to certain sorts of
natural kinds. Be that as it may, something needs to be said in support of this.
We may attempt to trace the modal content here more rigorously. Let us consider
the general case, which is what Soames seems to support. What would the empirical
implications be like? Well, we know that the manner in which chemical compounds
are formed is directly dependent on the atomic structure of the atoms involved,
which naturally involves their electron configuration. Further, we know that the
electron configuration depends on the energy levels of specific electrons and is
moderated by the Pauli Exclusion Principle. Very quickly, this regress goes all the
way down to fundamental forces, which are ultimately responsible for the binding
of atoms. Accordingly, the claim that substances have their molecular structure
essentially implies that the laws of physics governing the binding of atoms are
metaphysically necessary. It is unsettling that something as widely acknowledged
as the necessity of “Water = H2O” commits us to such strong claims.
Perhaps it is a physical necessity that substances have the particular molecular
structure that they actually have, but it would be precarious to claim, without
argument, that the fundamental forces could not have been arranged otherwise to
7 Earlier concerns about these issues have been raised by Salmon (2005) and Bealer (1987).
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produce a substance exactly like water in every detail, apart from the molecular
structure. It is not clear how we are supposed to decide whether this substance
would be water or not, and the claim at hand does not concern only water, but all
substances. Certainly, something must be said about the general essence of sub-
stances to make sense of this claim, namely whether or not it is an essential feature
of substances that they have the particular molecular structure that they actually
have. This is a subject that is of course beyond empirical research, but more
importantly: empirical research concerning substances would not be possible in the
first place if we did not have at least some a priori knowledge about the general
essence of substances.8
We may have a strong intuition about the essentiality of composition for sub-
stances, but the typical Kripkean story about these matters takes this as given, when
clearly the source of this intuition should be our primary interest. In what follows
I will suggest that this intuition, if it is valid, must be based on a priori reasoning.
There have been some attempts (e.g., Salmon, 2005) to examine the source of this
intuition before, but it seems to me that they have been half-hearted at best. Some
guidelines for how we should proceed in this regard will be suggested in the last
section of this article.
It may seem that what has been said does not pose a challenge to the Kripkean
(or Putnamian), as the Twin-Earth story presumably allows for substances, such as
“XYZ”, that are superficially similar to water, but differ in molecular structure. It
is just that a substance like this is not water, or so the story goes. But what is the
argument for this assumption? As we saw, Soames certainly gives us no argument
for it. It seems to be simply built in the account that we have the intuition that XYZ
would not be water. A potential line of thought that might support this assumption
is the one that was sketched above, but that line of thought seems to be unable to
account for the necessity of “Water = H2O”, because the assumption that substances
essentially have the molecular structure that they actually have is not supported. But
even if there were an appropriate a priori argument available we would have
reasons to doubt the route by which the necessity of “Water = H2O” was established,
as Lowe (2007) has convincingly argued.9
Similar problems emerge with other classic examples, such as “Gold is the
element with the atomic number 79”. Do elements essentially have the atomic
number that they actually have? Perhaps alternative physics which produces the
periodic table with atomic numbers different from the actual ones, yet elements
indistinguishable from the actual ones is metaphysically possible – perhaps not. In
8 The relationship between a priori inquiry and empirical research has been discussed extensively in
Tahko (2008).
9 These reasons are derived from the Finean understanding of essence, namely that it should not be
treated as a special case of metaphysical necessity. I take this point and develop it in what follows.
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any case, this is not something that can be settled by considering Twin-Earth
scenarios. Rather, what we need is research concerning the essences of substances
and elements.
4. A Sideline: How the Account at Hand Differs from the Deflationary Line
The upshot of the previous section is that we should take the essences of whichever
entities we are concerned with more seriously than the classic Kripkean line does,
but the shortcomings of the Kripkean line have also inspired completely opposite
reactions. It should be made clear that the account being proposed here is not at all
similar to the deflationary line suggested by Alan Sidelle and others. Sidelle
analyses identity statements such as “Water = H2O” as follows:10
[E]ach necessary a posteriori truth should be seen as derived from a combination of an analytic
principle of individuation that has empty spaces to be filled in by empirical findings and a particular
empirical finding that of itself carries no modal weight. For example, in the case of water’s being
necessarily H2O, the analytic principle might be “Nothing counts as water in any situation unless it
has the same deep explanatory features (if any) as the stuff we call ‘water’ ”, and the empirical fact,
which makes the result a posteriori, is that the deep explanatory feature of the stuff we call “water”
is being composed of H2O (Sidelle, 2002, p. 319).
Sidelle goes on to suggest that there is nothing metaphysical in the modal content
of a posteriori necessities; instead we are dealing with analytic, linguistic prin-
ciples. Given what has been said above, it is not hard to contest Sidelle’s line. The
supposed a priori content in a posteriori necessities can indeed be interpreted
roughly like Sidelle, as well as Jackson (1998) and Chalmers (1996), suggest.
However, we have already seen that the empirical part is not empty of modal
content, i.e., that empirical inquiry does carry modal weight, as it involves a priori
knowledge concerning at least the general essences of whatever kinds of entities we
happen to be dealing with.11 For Sidelle and others, the focus seems to be on the
analytic a priori principle which is supposedly responsible for the modal content
of a posteriori necessities. Consequently, when Sidelle (as well as Jackson and
Chalmers) talk about the a priori part in a posteriori necessities, they are talking
about something that is analytic or linguistic in nature. The a priori part that we
have been referring to is within the empirical, a posteriori part of the story, it
10 Sidelle refers, quite correctly, to Frank Jackson (1998) and David Chalmers (1996) in this connection
– they take a somewhat similar line regarding a posteriori necessities.
11 Hence, I think that scientists (and everyone else) have a priori knowledge of general essences. Our
epistemic access to essences is, I believe, based on our knowledge of metaphysical possibilities, which we
can analyse with the help of a priori reasoning. However, it is not possible to provide a sufficient account of
the epistemology of essences here; I merely wish to point out that we must have some kind of a priori access
to essences to be able to explain metaphysical necessities. Accordingly, we are certainly not dealing with
linguistic or conceptual knowledge here, but rather the most fundamental kind of metaphysical knowledge.
350 TUOMAS E. TAHKO
© 2009 Stiftelsen Theoria
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd
precedes the empirical discovery.12 However, it is not my purpose here to refute or
examine the deflationary views; it will be sufficient to note that they are in the
opposite end of the scale.
5. A Priori Instead of A Posteriori Metaphysically Necessary Truths?
The quarrel that I have with the Kripkean line is thus altogether different from the
Sidelle–Chalmers–Jackson line; it concerns the nature of essences and their role in
the supposed a posteriori necessities. Lowe sums this up as follows:
If Soames is right, the key contribution of Kripke to the metaphysics of essence was to show how,
by combining a priori knowledge of general essential truths with a posteriori knowledge of particu-
lar actual facts, we could generate instances of particular essential truths that are knowable only a
posteriori (Lowe, 2007, p. 291).
Lowe goes on to suggest that it is more likely that essential truths are knowable
only a priori if they are knowable at all. In fact, it appears that the cart has been put
before the horse here: it looks as if particular facts, e.g., that water is in fact H2O,
are the reason for the intuitions concerning general essential truths, e.g., that
substances have their actual molecular structures essentially – or, at any rate, the a
priori inquiry that led to this general essential truth has not been made explicit.
Accordingly, the move to particular essential truths, e.g., that water has its molecu-
lar structure essentially, seems unwarranted even within the Kripkean scheme.
However, our main concern is that the Kripkean scheme is misleading to start with.
An alternative account, on the lines of Fine and Lowe (although Fine seems to be
neutral regarding our epistemic access to essences), would be to give the priority to
essences, in which case a priori inquiry into the essences of the entities under
investigation is enough – a posteriori knowledge of particular actual facts need not
enter the picture. It would indeed appear that, at least in some cases, supposed a
posteriori necessities are not a posteriori at all, but rather a priori. Lowe (2007)
also questions whether particular substances, such as water, even have individual
essences. It is thus safer to illustrate the scheme with the help of another example,
preferably one that does not concern individual essences. I will now proceed to
analyse the details of the a priori work that we need to engage in to establish the
necessity of some common examples of supposed a posteriori necessities.
Consider the classic example “Cats are Animals”. Nathan Salmon has provided
a Kripkean analysis of this and related examples:
We know a priori that if a biological kind (e.g., a species) k is subsumed under a higher-level
biological kind (e.g., a genus, class, kingdom, etc.) k′, then it is necessary that k is subsumed under
12 It should be mentioned in this connection that the decoupling of a priori and a posteriori content here
is somewhat misleading, as has been demonstrated in Tahko (2008).
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k′. We also know by the direct reference theory of the designation of natural kind terms that such
terms as “cat”, “tiger”, “mammal”, and “animal” are rigid designators of natural kinds. Putting these
two together, we know a priori, by “philosophical analysis,” that if all cats are animals, then it is
necessary that all cats are animals, and if all tigers are mammals, then it is necessary that all tigers
are mammals, etc. Science discovers empirically that cats are in fact animals, and that tigers are in
fact mammals. Combining these scientific discoveries with what we know a priori by philosophical
analysis, we infer that it is necessary, even though a posteriori, that cats are animals and that tigers
are mammals. Given what we know by philosophical analysis – the theory of direct reference plus
the a priori essentialist fact that every biological kind k is such that it could not fail to be subsumed
under any of the higher level biological kinds k′ that in fact subsume it – any empirical discovery that
cats are in fact animals, or that tigers are in fact mammals, is indirectly but automatically an
empirical discovery that it is necessary that cats are animals, or that tigers are mammals (Salmon,
2005, p. 195).
Leaving aside for the moment the problems involved with natural kind terms –
and whether “animal” even constitutes a natural kind – it seems clear that the a
priori content concerning the supposed a posteriori necessity “Cats are Animals”
includes knowledge about the necessary connection between a higher-level cat-
egory and a lower-level category, i.e., a category and its subcategory. However, it is
less clear what the status of the empirical discovery that cats are in fact animals is.
An alternative analysis of the example reveals that we might be able to establish
the necessity of “Cats are Animals” entirely by a priori means. If we have a priori
access to categorial information, which information concerning the category of
“Animals” presumably is, then we can grasp the general essence of the category of
“Animals”. Similarly, we can grasp the general essence of the kind “Cat”, and it is
surely part of the general essence of the kind “Cat” that it is a subcategory of
“Animals”.13 In other words, simply by the a priori information concerning the
necessary connection between a category and its subcategory, and by the a priori
information concerning the general essences of “Cats” and “Animals”, namely that
the first is a subcategory of the latter, we can derive the necessity of “Cats are
Animals”. The empirical discovery that cats are in fact animals does not enter the
picture, contrary to how the Kripkeans would have it. This seems quite plausible,
because even describing what the empirical discovery that cats are in fact animals
is appears to be problematic. To establish that cats are animals, we must already
know what animals are, that is, we must have grasped the general essence of
“Animals”. Furthermore, before we can engage in any empirical research concern-
ing cats, we must also have grasped the general essence of “Cats”. Thus, we could
discover, by empirical means, that the creatures we thought were cats are in fact
13 Why think that we would have a priori access to categorial information? Well, for one thing, it seems
that we can have information about merely possible kinds of entities, and this information could not be a
posteriori (because there are no entities of that kind in the actual world). Much more would need to be said
about this of course, but I only hope to hint towards an alternative analysis of what is going on in supposed
cases of a posteriori necessity. This type of approach has also been hinted towards by Lowe (e.g., 2007).
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demons, but this only means that in the actual world there are no cats, but only
“fool’s cats”.14 It would still be the case that “Cats are Animals” is a necessary
a priori truth – in all possible worlds where cats exist, they are animals.
One concern that might emerge at this point is that “Animal” is vague: are for
instance viruses animals?15 Perhaps it is even a part of the essence of “Animal” that
it is vague. As I noted above, I do not wish to engage in a thorough analysis of
“animal” here; perhaps it does not even constitute a natural kind. However, although
there is clearly vagueness over natural kind terms, I think that we are here dealing
with linguistic rather than metaphysical vagueness. In general, we might be wrong
about what the identity and existence conditions of certain natural kinds are, or
mistaken about a natural kind altogether, but this does not imply that there has to be
metaphysical vagueness over the matter. Accordingly, we can and often do make
mistakes; even if we have a priori access to the essences of natural kinds, it does not
mean that we always get the story right. The point of this article is to underline this.
A further analysis of the epistemic side of the story might be helpful, although
I have discussed it in more detail elsewhere (cf. Tahko, 2008). Firstly, the notion of
“a priori” is not being used in its traditional sense here, although for current
purposes it might be enough to note that we are dealing with synthetic rather than
analytic a priori knowledge. It is also crucial for this account that information
about essences precedes empirical information. The link between our a priori
capabilities and knowledge about essences is metaphysical modality: a priori
reasoning concerns metaphysical modality and metaphysical modality is grounded
in essences, as the Fine–Lowe line suggests. So, “Cats are Animals” could be
considered an a priori metaphysical necessity in virtue of:
1. A priori knowledge concerning the necessary connection between a cat-
egory and its subcategory, namely that a category has its subcategories by
necessity.
2. A priori knowledge concerning the general essence of “Animals”, namely
that “Animals” is a categorial term capable of having certain types of
subcategories, i.e., instances of “Animals”.
3. A priori knowledge concerning the general essence of “Cats”, namely that it
is metaphysically possible that there are creatures such as cats which satisfy
the criteria for a subcategory of “Animals”, i.e., they are instances of
animals.
Perhaps the most interesting part is the third one. We only need a priori know-
ledge about the metaphysical possibility of a kind such as “Cats” to be able to grasp
the general essence of “Cats”. Once we have the general essences of “Cats” and
14 Kripke was right about this.
15 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
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“Animals”, we only need to add the further piece of a priori knowledge concerning
categories and subcategories to be able to determine that “Cats are Animals” is an
a priori metaphysical necessity. We do not need to refer to actual cats or animals at
all; the metaphysical necessity holds regardless of the status of cats and animals in
the actual world, even if there are no such entities.
So, it appears that we can provide an analysis of the necessity of “Cats are
Animals” which does not rely on empirical information, but how about “Tigers are
Mammals”? It might seem that it is less plausible that the empirical discovery that
tigers are in fact mammals does not enter the picture, although the case appears to
be analogous to “Cats are Animals” – it certainly is for Salmon. However, it is
questionable whether “Mammal” behaves in the same manner as “Animal”. My
Oxford English Dictionary defines “Mammal” as a warm-blooded vertebrate
animal, which has hair or fur, produces milk and typically gives birth to live young.
These features, it seems, are contingent: could tigers not evolve in such a manner
that they cease to fulfil the criteria of “Mammal”? Accordingly, perhaps we are not
dealing with a natural kind here at all, and perhaps “Tigers are Mammals” is indeed
a posteriori, but also contingent. This highlights the fact that we must be particu-
larly sensitive to the subject-matter of the identity-statements that we are dealing
with, they must receive individual treatment. As I noted above, we could easily be
altogether mistaken about some natural kinds; this may even be the case with
“Animals”, which makes the study of the essences of whichever entities we are
dealing with all the more important.
We can now also reconsider the case of “Water = H2O”. We would need at least
the a priori information that substances have their molecular structure by necessity,
i.e., information concerning the general essence of chemical substances, to be able
to determine that water molecules are necessarily composed of two hydrogen atoms
and one oxygen atom – this much is uncontroversial. However, as we saw, it is far
from obvious what the general essence of chemical substances includes. It may be
that there is nothing more to the story in addition to the a priori principles
concerning chemical substances: unless water has a further, individual essence, we
can establish the necessity of water being H2O simply with the help of the general
essence of chemical substances. Of course, it is also an open question whether
water does have an individual essence. In any case, if the appropriate a priori
arguments can be established, then similar analysis would be available in the case
of “Water = H2O” as we saw above in the case of “Cats are Animals”. It appears
though that such arguments are extremely difficult to establish. However, I admit
that I share the intuition that chemical substances have their molecular structure
essentially, and I would like to examine the origins of this intuition briefly.
In section 3 we observed that if this intuition is valid, then it must be a physical
necessity that chemical substances have the very molecular structure that they in
fact have. How could we support this claim? Well, the forming of molecules is
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dependent on the bonding ability of atoms, a crucial feature of which is the electron
configuration of atoms. As we have already noted, this is moderated by the Pauli
Exclusion Principle. Now, the question is whether we could have a different set of
atoms, call it XYZ, which could produce the chemical substance water. Note again
that the Twin-Earth scenario does not have a bearing on this: we are looking for a
justification for the intuition on which the whole scenario is based (at least when it
is interpreted as expressing something metaphysically substantial, as serious essen-
tialists would have it). It seems thus that our intuitions underlying the Twin-Earth
scenario and related examples have not been sufficiently analysed in this regard. As
has already been argued, the intuition that chemical substances have their molecular
structures essentially implies that certain laws of physics are necessary. But this is
a very controversial assumption – it appears that some worlds with different laws of
physics are ruled out as impossible automatically. Now, if they are indeed impos-
sible, surely this requires a more detailed discussion.
Perhaps it should also be noted that even though water appears, on the face of it,
to be a non-functional, compositional stuff,16 what we are really interested in are its
chemical properties rather than its composition. That is, if we had a substance that
has exactly the same chemical properties as water but a different molecular com-
position, would we really be entitled to say that it is not water? As I have stressed
above, I do not think that this has been established. However, if it is indeed a physical
necessity that chemical substances have their molecular structures essentially, then
we simply could not have a substance that has the same chemical properties as water,
but a different molecular composition. Accordingly, the intuition that XYZ would
not be water, if it is a valid intuition, is based on the fact that there could not beXYZ!
It is an interesting question whether the intuition really is valid. It certainly seems
that in the actual world there could not be a combination of atoms XYZ such that it
would replicate the chemical properties of water, although we would have to turn to
our colleagues in physics and chemistry for the details. But it is up to philosophers
to determine whether the situation could be different in other possible worlds – our
colleagues in the empirical sciences can do very little to assist us in this regard.
Indeed, this is why the necessity of the identity statement “Water = H2O”, if the
identity is necessary, has to be established by a priori means.
I do not have an a priori proof at hand which would establish the essentiality of
composition for chemical substances. I suspect that such a proof is available though
and my guess is that it will have something to do with the laws that govern
the forming of macrophysical objects. The manner in which subatomic particles
form atoms and atoms bind together to form molecules is not arbitrary and it
seems plausible to think that, had fundamental forces been arranged otherwise,
16 As opposed to, say, food (cf. Bealer, 1987, p. 296).
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macrophysical objects would not be possible at all. This is because even the
slightest change in these forces would cause instability – perhaps the Pauli Exclu-
sion Principle would not hold and electrons would end up in the same quantum
state, rendering bonds between atoms impossible. Perhaps the nuclei of atoms
would not hold together because the strong force that overpowers the repulsive
forces between quarks would not be quite strong enough. Granted, all this is very
speculative, but it seems to be the only way to go if we hope to establish the
essentiality of composition for chemical substances. It seems to me that the likeliest
candidate responsible for the essentiality of composition is the Pauli Exclusion
Principle. Although I have no means to prove it here, I think that this principle is a
very likely candidate for a metaphysically necessary law of physics.
It should be clear by now what my preferred analysis of modal truths is. I most
certainly do not wish to ground modal truths to conceptual truths. As we saw, this
is the line that Sidelle, Jackson and Chalmers would perhaps take. I wish to ground
modal truths to essential truths, following Kit Fine, i.e., it is the essence of water
that makes it necessary that “Water = H2O”, if anything. Or, more accurately, it is
the essence of chemical substances, if anything, that makes it necessary that “Water
= H2O”, as the key assumption is that chemical substances have their molecular
structures essentially. This line may or may not be different from the Kripkean line;
that makes little difference to me. What I wish to emphasise is that the truthmakers
of modal claims are essences, not concepts.
Obviously, matters are a lot more complicated than it is often suggested. It is not
easy to determine when an identity statement holds by necessity. The origin of these
problems seems to be a misconception concerning the “logic of essence”, as Lowe
puts it (2007, p. 291): in the Kripkean picture essences are apparently derived from
semantic intuitions rather than from metaphysical considerations, and thus provide
illegitimate grounds for modal truths. The ease with which the purported necessity
of certain identity statements has been established is suspicious at the very least,
and it appears that one reason for this unwarranted lapse in critical analysis is the
ambiguity over the semantic and metaphysical agendas in Kripke’s Naming and
Necessity. However, it could of course turn out that, despite these shortcomings,
most or all of the usual examples of a posteriori necessities are indeed necessary,
but perhaps we have been too hasty to conclude that they are also a posteriori. The
best course of action to settle the matter is to analyse these cases rigorously in the
manner suggested above.
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